How to find the terrorists (and why 'Prevent', the UK's approach, doesn't work)

An effective counter-terrorism programme will focus far more on the ideation of violence, or indeed actual violence, than on some kid shouting ‘allahu akbar’ or ‘sieg heil’ at their teacher

Back in 2019 I wrote a short blog post asking whether terrorism is determined more by factors other than extremist ideology. Asking this question essentially turns the rationale for the UK government’s ‘Prevent’ programme on its head. ‘Prevent’ is predicated on the idea that, if we intervene early when individuals, especially children, access and appear interested in extremist ideology then these individuals can be set back on the right path thereby avoiding them becoming terrorists. Much of the ‘Prevent’ activity is undertaken by local authorities (either directly or else by funding voluntary sector organisations) rather than by the police. There is, however, a ‘Prevent’ duty created by the Counter Terrorism and Security Act of 2015:

“The Prevent duty requires specified authorities such as education, health, local authorities, police and criminal justice agencies (prisons and probation) to help prevent the risk of people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. It sits alongside long-established safeguarding duties on professionals to protect people from a range of other harms, such as substance abuse, involvement in gangs, and physical and sexual exploitation. The duty helps to ensure that people who are susceptible to radicalisation are supported as they would be under safeguarding processes.”

The gist of my 2029 blog post was that “...extremist thought, even were it adequately definable in a society that values free speech, is a very poor predictor of violent action”. This comes from an article by Mike Martin who, as it happens, is now the Liberal Democrat MP for Tunbridge Wells but back then was a former army officer and visiting fellow in War Studies at King's College London. Martin’s contention was that:

“Terrorism reflects the world that we live in. Globalisation, and particularly immigration, has detached people from the groups they once belonged to: their families, their ethnicities, and their nations. The modern world can be a profoundly lonely place. If individuals feel that they don’t belong, they are more likely to reach out for extreme ideas that will fill that vacuum, offering them a sense of identity.”

In simple terms terrorists like the Southport murderer feel like outsiders in the place of their birth and turn to extremism in their search for an identity. I’m not convinced by Martin’s argument except that his diagnosis of the problem with ‘Prevent’ is spot on: the programme is ineffective and too many dangerous people pass through its programmes without anyone spotting the risk they present. I am much more interested in another observation from Martin in his article:

“...an overwhelming majority of those with extremist thoughts, far more than 99%, do not commit violent actions.”

In Neal Stephenson’s novel ‘Reamde’ there is a character called Abdullah Jones who is an Islamist terrorist. Importantly Jones isn’t just a Muslim but one radicalised in prison and with a history of violent behaviour before converting to Islam. Stephenson portrays the character as a man who, first and foremost, enjoys violence. The Islamic extremism isn’t the reason for his violence but the fig leaf valorising those actions. Nearly all people attracted by things society calls extremism (it is worth noting, for example, that the UK counter terror system sees fascism as extremism but not communism) are not going to commit acts of terrorism. So sifting through extremists becomes the proverbial act of finding a needle in a haystack.

The kneejerk response to men like the Southport killer being referred to ‘Prevent’ is to suggest that the programme fails because it doesn’t have enough money or it is itself ideologically compromised by refusing to see Islam as a problem. It is probably true that, given most acts of terrorism in the UK involve Islamist extremism, the ‘Prevent’ programme is underwhelming since the largest part of its referrals are people involved with ‘far right’ extremism. Partly this reflects the worldview of the people most likely to make referrals (teachers, social workers, youth workers, council officials) but it also obscures the central failing of the whole programme. The mere fact of me owning and reading the Communist Manifesto and Mao’s Little Red Book hasn’t so far turned me into a communist. And reading extremist material (the ‘Anarchists Cookbook’ anyone?) is not an especially good predictor of someone becoming a terrorist.

In the end, however, the central premise of Britain’s strategy, radicalisation, seems to be flawed. Here’s Prof. John Horgan, Director of the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies in conversation at the American Psychological Association:

“I think it’s becoming very, very difficult to identify potential terrorists. In recent years, we’ve had a very, a very emotional and a very, I suppose, engaging conversation about who becomes a terrorist and why. And that discussion has been rooted in this concept of radicalization. And one of the assumptions in that has been that people become radicalized, they get exposed to certain kinds of thoughts, certain kinds of ideas and that then somehow puts them at greater risk for involvement in terrorism. The more evidence we’re finding, particularly from first-hand interviews with former terrorists, is that logic may not necessarily hold in very, very many cases, as intuitive as it might seem. So, we’re finding right now that the initial concept of radicalization isn’t as helpful as we once thought and certainly, we need to go back to basics with respect to much of the research here.”

In all this discussion it is important too to make a distinction between different types of terrorists and terrorism. It is clear that the ideological rationale for violence remains important but there are overlaps and similarities between terrorists and non-terrorists. And this is especially true in the case of lone terrorists such as the Southport killer and the murderer of MP David Amess. There is a lot of evidence (and we see this with the Southport killer whose father tried to get police involved) that terrorists signal their intentions and that, at least with hindsight, families and friends can point to behaviours and comments that indicate the violent intent:

“Some terrorists, especially lone actors, leak or broadcast their intentions prior to their attacks. Knowing this, the field must develop and promote better strategies to detect and prevent such attacks. Although friends, family members, and coworkers may be well placed to detect violent ideation and intention, the fact that they know the individual creates a natural barrier to reporting. There needs to be greater effort to educate the public about the signs of attack leakage and broadcasting. Furthermore, there must be a concerted effort to provide clear, accessible, and convenient means of reporting such concerns.”

And when these concerns are raised, there must be a willingness to act from public authorities. The very act of arresting and questioning may, even if no formal charges are made, act to show authority is aware and to stay the potential terrorist’s hand.

It is very easy to simply point the finger at one or two ideologies, selecting them for special opprobrium, but an effective counter-terrorism programme is going to focus far more on the ideation of violence, or indeed actual violence, than on some kid shouting ‘allahu akbar’ or ‘sieg heil’ at their teacher to get a reaction. And when people are referred to these programmes we should do something rather more than what amounts to talking therapy. This, of course, means that some of the things that determine the ideological justification for violence (religious supremacy, racism, ethnic identity, etc.) must get more attention even if they generate manufactured offence from political or religious organisations.

Finally we do need to note, because this has to inform any counter-terrorism strategy, that over two thirds of terrorist incidents in the UK are linked to Islamist ideologies. It is not ‘islamophobic’ to point out this fact and it is a reminder that some aspects of Islam’s teachings are used to valorise violence, murder and terrorism. It is also true that Iran and its terrorist proxies in Lebanon, Palestine and Yemen combine reverence for the prophet and holy sites with overt antisemitism and that, in many Muslim communities in Europe, this racism has become dangerously embedded. The failure of authorities to deal with racist marches in support of Israel’s extinction has made organised and lone actor terrorist attacks more, not less, likely.