The Tribes of the Right (and why this is bad news)
The descriptions below of eight right-wing tribes isn’t intended to be comprehensive but to try and illustrate how the route back for the political right presents such a challenge
I recall seeing a graph comparing the range of opinions on right and left. This presented the thesis that the left’s range of views, despite its fissiparous political nature, was far narrower than the range of views on the right. The narrowness almost certainly results from Marx’s ‘Capital’ being the ur-text for almost all left-wing opinions, even those like Fabianism and social democracy seen as moderate. While there will be different degrees of attachment, the left broadly agrees that capitalism is essentially bad, that the state should direct the economy and society, and that democracy is more important than liberty. As we’ve seen with the entertainly false launch of Your Party, much of the ideological basis for splits is, in reality, personality clashes and contests for power.
The right lacks such an anchor. There is no unifying ur-text (indeed it is arguable that conservatism lacks any substantial philosophical basis that isn’t essentially reactionary) and opinions on the right reflect this condition. As a result, unifying the right requires the careful triangulation of nationalism, liberalism, and conservatism. Lean too hard towards any of these poles and you inevitably alienate part of your constituency. There is no equivalent on the right of the Fabian ‘boiling frog’ strategy because the objectives of nationalism, conservatism and liberalism conflict, at least at the level of ideology. For much of the last 100 years, the unity of the right has been sustained by two strategies: opposing socialism and promoting a patriotic idea of internationalism. In doing this the right’s leadership, especially since the defeat of National Socialism in 1945, has actively opposed the melding of state socialism with racial purity and extreme nationalism.
This consensus has begun to crumble and the right is collapsing into a collection of tribes, often in competition, reflecting different aspects of liberalism, nationalism and conservatism. As a result we get Konstantin Kisin talking about the “woke right” while Tucker Carlson gives cuddly interviews to people who think Hitler wasn’t all that bad really. In Europe there’s a surge in ethnonationalism and cultural top trumps driven by the disturbing (and unpopular) surge in migration to Europe from Africa and the Middle East. But even in more moderate circles we see the breaking up of the right’s post-WW2 adherence to liberal ideas of internationalism, trade and law. The emerging economic thinking, seen most plainly in Donald Trump’s economic and trade policy, rejects ‘level playing field’ approaches to trade in favour of a ‘might is right’ approach.
I thought it might be helpful, therefore, to try and describe the various tribes on what we call the political right. We might also bear in mind that much of the terminology, categorisation and description of right-wing politics is the creation of non-neutral left-wing academia. The modern definitions of Fascism (as opposed to the definition of Fascism from actual Fascists), concepts like neoliberalism, globalism, and capitalism are all essentially pejorative terms developed by the left to, borrowing another word they love, demonise all of right-wing politics. In the context of the conflict in Gaza, the left has also begun to reframe concepts like genocide, apartheid and colonialism as well as notions of indigeneity, origin and culture. There’s no doubt that the views of people like Nick Fuentes in the USA and Connor Tomlinson in Britain are little different from mid-20th century Fascism and National Socialism, but the left’s use of the terms ‘fascist’ or ‘nazi’ are a much broader attempt to undermine nationalist and conservative ideas: witness the frequency with which Zack Polanski, Britain’s Green Party leader calls people fascists and ideas fascism.
The descriptions below of eight right-wing tribes isn’t intended to be comprehensive but to try and illustrate how, with the breaking up of the Thatcher-Reagan coalitions, the route back to a coherent programme for human betterment on the political right presents some considerable challenges to say the least.
Ethnonationalists and cultural supremacists. Some in this tribe hark back to the 20th century marriage between statism and nationalism but others remain more ideologically liberal, at least in economic terms. But the tribal coherence comes from the certainty that the problems of society - crime, jobs, growth, family - can all be resolved by the ending of migration and, often, by the exile of people who don’t pass a purity test, usually skin colour or religion.
Zoom Zoomers. A collection of liberal-minded, usually younger, people who adhere to an idea of consequentialist utilitarianism. While this is outwardly a liberal group, its policies, typified by the market YIMBY movement, is characterised by the supremacy of economics and ‘New Deal’ style interventions. There will be talk of trade offs but these are always resolved by preference for urban economic development - for ‘zoom zoom whizz whizz’ - over conservative ideas of family, neighbourhood and duty.
Know Nothings. Often aligned with the ethnonationalists and cultural supremacists, Know Nothings, a term borrowed from the nickname for the 19th century US Native American Party, refers to isolationist economic ideas, important substitution policies and a sort of Peronist attachment to labour and especially organised manual labour. This group believe that the liberal economics of Thatcher and Reagan were an aberration in right wing thought and wish for something akin to beer and sandwiches at Number 10 to thrash out an industrial strategy.
Classical Liberals. Electorally insignificant but intellectually important might best describe this group. Respected institutions like the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) and the Cato Institute produce informed and evidenced arguments for free market liberalism. The left, defined as it is by a knee-jerk anti-capitalism, often present these ‘think tanks’ as the vanguard of what they see as ‘far-right’ or even ‘fascist’ ideas but claims of their influence vastly exceed any actual influence. Most of those still attached to the Thatcher-Reagan consensus on economic liberalism are in this tribe.
Old Skool Tories. Not that there’s any pubs left but the reactionary bloke at the end of the bar defines this group’s ideology. There’s no love for business, certainly not big business, Old Skool Tories are keen on the state as a way to control things they don’t like. They like the green belt, dislike women priests and gay marriage, and hark back to a time when “we made things”. Although most MAGA sorts are Know Nothings, the old school right is another big part of the Trump coalition. There’s an offshoot here of Young Fogeys who talk a lot about beauty, quote Roger Scruton, and don’t like the National Trust.
Christian Revivalists. We don’t hear so much these days about ‘family values conservatives’ but there’s an important group, usually associated with a sort of 21st century muscular Christianity, who focus on family, community and social concerns such as marriage, fertility, abortion and health. The leading adherent to this is probably JD Vance the US Vice-President but there are many others such as Miriam Cates and Danny Kruger in the UK. If such folk speak of economics it is usually in aligning themselves with isolationist ideas of tariffs, economic intervention and import substitution but their main attention goes to what used to be called family values but, in truth, is a wider idea of the West as Christendom.
Libertarians. For a few years in the 1990s and 2000s libertarianism, anarcho-capitalism and other logical conclusions of liberalism were quite influential. Ayn Rand and other philosophers of ultra-liberalism became, if not household names, rather better known than their ideas merited. Still, people like Tyler Cowan at GMU continue to influence the intellectual agenda to a degree beyond libertarianism’s popular support. A milder form of libertarianism was evident from populist politicians like Nigel Farage (although this has faded as Farage smells the prospect of power). Libertarians, and the closely connected classical liberals, have their poster child now in the form of Argentina’s chainsaw-wielding president, Javier Milei.
Democracy Sucks. It would be wrong to call this part of the right ‘authoritarians’ because they are quite often fairly liberal. What we have, however, is an idea that democracy has failed western societies. Partly this reflects the Lord Woodhouselee idea that eventually people will simply vote to have the state give them other people’s money, but it also reflects the extent to which organised - often astroturf - groups control the policy-making process without reference to the public interest.
This typology obviously reflects my prejudices and preferences but I hope it illustrates the problem facing the right. Even in the UK’s winner-take-all electoral system the prospects for a right of centre government are poor unless something closer to the old Thatcher-Reagan compromise between nation, community and economy is forged. This becomes a clearer priority the more we see that the economic approach of the Trump/Vance administration is not transforming the USA. At the same time we need policies that are more values-based, less divisive and that reflect tradition, cultural heritage and family life. This isn’t an argument for culture war but rather one of reflecting what people want from schools, police, local government and public service in general.